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  The news has been peppered with tragic stories of individuals with 
disabilities who have been killed or injured following police 
encounters. In the aftermath of these incidents, as injured parties seek 
accountability, a question looms: Can arrest proceedings violate the 
Americans with Disabilities Act?  
  The ADA was enacted to prohibit disability discrimination. The law 
had an ambitious agenda, supported by broad statutory authority, to 
ensure equality in all areas of public life for individuals with 
disabilities. But while the ADA has fostered integration into many 
aspects of modern life, one area remains deeply contested: arrests.  
  If Congress envisioned that Americans with disabilities would enjoy 
lives free from discrimination, excluding arrests from ADA coverage 
undermines the law’s broad promise of protection. In 2015, a Supreme 
Court opinion raised but failed to resolve this very issue, leaving an 
important question unanswered. This Note examines whether arrest 
proceedings must comply with the ADA and argues that they should. 
It then proposes comprehensive disability training as a tool to aid ADA 
compliance and avoid discriminatory arrest proceedings. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Robert Ethan Saylor, a young man with Down syndrome, was 
fascinated by police officers.1 He frequently called the local dispatcher, 
eager to converse.2 In a tragic irony, Saylor died at the hands of the 
very people he admired. On January 12, 2013, Saylor went to the 
movies with his aide, Mary Crosby, but grew distressed as the two 
prepared to leave.3 While Crosby went to get the car, Saylor sneaked 
back to the theater for a second viewing.4 When Crosby came looking 
for him, the theater manager demanded that Saylor buy a second ticket 
or leave.5 Crosby told the manager that Saylor had Down syndrome 
and asked that everyone keep their distance, as she was best equipped 
to handle the situation.6 Disregarding her advice, three off-duty 
deputies were dispatched to remove Saylor from the theater.7 He was 
quietly sitting in his seat when they approached,8 but a struggle then 
ensued. The officers tackled Saylor to the floor, fracturing his larynx in 
the process.9 Saylor died from asphyxiation shortly thereafter.10 He was 
twenty-six years old, with an IQ of forty, and presented features 
associated with Down syndrome.11 Saylor’s family filed a lawsuit 
including a claim for failure to train the police officers in violation of 
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).12  
Ethan Saylor’s story is devastatingly common: it is the story of 
tragedy at the hands of law enforcement officers who fail to 
appropriately engage individuals with disabilities in arrest 
proceedings.13 Cases that address injurious arrests of individuals with 
 
 1. Theresa Vargas, Md. Man with Down Syndrome Who Died in Police Custody Loved  
Law Enforcement, WASH. POST (Feb. 19, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/md-man-
with-down-syndrome-who-died-in-police-custody-loved-law-enforcement/2013/02/19/10e09fe0-7
ad5-11e2-82e8-61a46c2cde3d_story.html [https://perma.cc/M6XQ-YM6F].  
 2. Id. 
 3. Estate of Saylor v. Regal Cinemas, Inc., 54 F. Supp. 3d 409, 413 (D. Md. 2014).  
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id.  
 9. Id. at 414. 
 10. Id.  
 11. Id. at 413. 
 12. Id. at 414–15. 
 13. Recently, a behavioral therapist and caretaker to a man with autism was shot when police 
officers responded to a call about a man allegedly threatening suicide. The officers drew their 
guns and shot the caretaker despite him telling the police officers that the man he was looking 
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disabilities generally draw on Title II of the ADA.14 But the circuits are 
split on whether police officers’ actions should be exempt from ADA 
coverage altogether, deferring to officers’ decisions in the face of 
exigent circumstances.15 A recent decision from the Ninth Circuit, City 
of San Francisco v. Sheehan,16 requires police officers to accommodate 
an individual’s disability in an arrest proceeding despite a potential 
exigency, accentuating the circuit split.  
In August 2008, San Francisco police officers received a call from 
a social worker at a group home requesting that they check on a 
patient, Teresa Sheehan.17 Sheehan, who suffered from schizophrenia, 
had been off her medication, and the group-home staff feared for her 
safety.18 When the police approached Sheehan’s room, she threatened 
them with a knife and insisted they leave her alone.19 Sheehan was shot 
multiple times in her bedroom, but ultimately survived.20 She filed suit 
against the city, claiming the police officers failed to reasonably 
accommodate her disability in violation of the ADA.21 The Ninth 
Circuit agreed and held that officers are obliged to reasonably 
accommodate an individual’s disability in the course of an arrest.22 The 
city appealed the decision to the Supreme Court, which granted 
certiorari.23  
 
after had autism and was holding a toy truck. See Niraj Chokshi, North Miami Police Officers 
Shoot Man Aiding Patient with Autism, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/
07/22/us/north-miami-police-officers-shoot-man-aiding-patient-with-autism.html [https://perma.
cc/KA38-DM47]. 
 14. See, e.g., Schorr v. Borough of Lemoyne, 243 F. Supp. 2d 232, 234–35 (M.D. Pa. 2003) 
(recognizing the application of Title II of the ADA in a failure-to-train claim arising from an 
arrest proceeding). 
 15. Compare id. (recognizing the application of Title II to police officers’ decisions), with 
Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 801 (5th Cir. 2000) (“Title II does not apply to an officer’s on-
the-street responses to reported disturbances . . . .”), and De Boise v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 760 F.3d 
892, 899 (8th Cir. 2014) (acknowledging the relevance of Title II but noting that the inquiries are 
fact intensive and deference should be given to police discretion in exigent circumstances). 
 16. City of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765 (2015). 
 17. Id. at 1770. 
 18. Id. at 1769. 
 19. Id. at 1770–71. 
 20. Id. at 1771. 
 21. Id.   
 22. See Sheehan v. City of San Francisco, 743 F.3d 1211, 1233 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d in part 
and cert. dismissed in part by 135 S. Ct. 1765 (2015) (denying judgment as a matter of law to the 
city by noting that a reasonable jury could find that the city failed to reasonably accommodate 
Sheehan and her disability). 
 23. Sheehan, 743 F.3d 1211, cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 1765 (2015) (No. 13-1412). 
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In its initial brief, the city argued that law enforcement activity in 
the course of an arrest should be exempt from the ADA.24 But in 
subsequent briefings and oral argument, the city agreed that the ADA 
applies to arrests25 and shifted to a subsidiary question.26 Frustrated 
with this pivot and consequently lacking sufficient information to issue 
an opinion, the Court dismissed the question of arrests under the ADA 
as improvidently granted.27 Before doing so, however, the Court 
articulated an applicable analytic structure for such cases. Writing for 
the majority, Justice Alito presented a two-pronged framework to 
evaluate whether arrests are covered under the ADA: (1) Is an arrest 
a public activity? and (2) Does the treatment an individual receives in 
the course of an arrest constitute discrimination?28 Although unable to 
provide an answer in this case, the Court recognized the importance of 
the question.29 But as for Ethan Saylor and the nearly fifty-six million 
Americans with a disability,30 the issue is not just important but 
potentially a matter of life and death.  
This Note applies the two-part framework from Sheehan to argue 
that arrests are activities of a public entity and that the treatment some 
individuals with disabilities receive in the course of such arrests can 
constitute discrimination. Accordingly, arrests should be subject to the 
protections afforded by Title II of the ADA. To ensure ADA 
compliance, law enforcement officers should reasonably accommodate 
an individual’s disability in the course of an arrest. Although courts 
generally recognize Title II as the relevant statute in such situations, 
 
 24. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 18–28, City of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 
1765 (2015) (No. 13-1412) (establishing the argument that law enforcement activity in the course 
of an arrest should be exempt from ADA compliance). The certiorari petition also included a 
question on qualified immunity for the law enforcement officers involved in the Sheehan case. Id. 
at 28–40. 
 25. It remains unknown why the petitioners in this case abandoned their primary argument. 
Political reasons may have been at play, as San Francisco is a predominately liberal jurisdiction 
and bringing an anti-civil rights lawsuit may have had negative political consequences for 
accountable officials, but this is mere speculation.   
 26. See Brief for Respondent at 25–26, City of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765 
(2015) (No. 13-1412) (noting that petitioners changed their argument from one categorically 
excluding reasonable accommodations under the ADA to one focused on the specific exclusion 
of Sheehan as an individual subject to the ADA because her dangerous behavior stripped her of 
her status as a “qualified individual”).  
 27. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. at 1773–74.   
 28. Id. at 1773.  
 29. Id. (describing the question of arrests under the ADA as an “important question that 
would benefit from briefing and an adversary presentation”). 
 30. MATTHEW W. BRAULT, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: 2010, 
at 5 (2012), http://www.census.gov/prod/2012pubs/p70-131.pdf [https://perma.cc/2XKK-EN7M]. 
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some are reluctant to provide redress under the ADA given the 
dangerous nature of policing. But their reluctance fails to account for 
the relevant regulatory guidance as well as the fact that disability 
training occurs before an officer is on the scene, faced with potential 
exigencies. Finally, this Note asserts that ADA compliance requires 
that police officers receive comprehensive disability training. Such 
training can help avoid discriminatory conduct by bridging the 
communication gap, thus improving law enforcement officers’ abilities 
to determine whether a perceived exigency presents a true threat or is 
merely innocuous disability-related behavior.  
With this in mind, Part I begins by providing additional 
background on the ADA and thereafter illustrates the interactions 
between law enforcement and individuals with disabilities. Part I also 
describes how other courts have analyzed arrests under Title II of the 
ADA. Before concluding, Part I examines Sheehan. Based on the 
analytic structure provided by Sheehan, Part II analyzes how the ADA 
applies to arrests. Part III explains why some courts have failed to 
recognize discriminatory arrests under the ADA. Part IV advocates for 
police officer training as a necessary ADA-compliance mechanism to 
prevent discrimination and preserve the mandate of the law.  
I.  BACKGROUND 
A.  An Overview of the ADA  
Approximately one in five Americans has a disability.31 Within 
that group, around 15.2 million adults have limited cognitive, mental, 
or emotional functioning,32 and an estimated 1.2 million adults have a 
diagnosed intellectual disability, such as Down syndrome.33 Thus, the 
ADA protects a large group of Americans. It is a remedial statute 
intended “to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for 
the elimination of discrimination against individuals with 
disabilities.”34 Indeed, the ADA is unprecedented among civil rights 
 
 31. Id. at 4. The ADA defines disability as “a physical or mental impairment that 
substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2012). 
 32. BRAULT, supra note 30, at 9.  
 33. Id.  
 34. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1); see also Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., The Americans with Disabilities 
Act: Analysis and Implications of a Second Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REV. 413, 426 (1991) (noting that pervasive discrimination present in many areas of social life 
presented “the factual underpinnings for the Americans with Disabilities Act”). 
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statutes in the breadth of activities covered35 and enforcement capacity 
granted to the Department of Justice (DOJ).36  
Twenty-six years after its enactment, the disability community 
continues to benefit from the ADA’s aggressive enforcement by both 
the DOJ and private attorneys.37 Over this time period, the law has 
proven flexible by incorporating technological advancements and 
other aspects of modern life.38 The degree of protection afforded under 
the ADA is due, in part, to a clear statutory purpose emphasizing an 
intentional breadth of coverage.39 That individuals with disabilities 
deserve equal access to all aspects of American life is a consistent 
theme throughout the legislative history of the law,40 highlighting the 
incongruity in allowing individuals with disabilities to integrate into 
some, but not all, aspects of community life. Thus, if Congress 
envisioned that Americans with disabilities would enjoy lives free from 
discrimination, categorically excluding arrests undermines the ADA’s 
broad promise of protection.  
 
 35. See Burgdorf, supra note 34, at 426.  
 36. See id. at 415 (“The ADA constitutes a second-generation civil rights statute that goes 
beyond the ‘naked framework’ of earlier statutes and adds much flesh and refinement to 
traditional nondiscrimination law.”).  
 37. See Loretta E. Lynch, Attorney Gen., Remarks at Justice Department  
Event Commemorating the 25th Anniversary of the Americans with Disabilities Act (July  
23, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-loretta-e-lynch-delivers-remarks-
justice-department-event-commemorating [https://perma.cc/2J6V-BG9X] (“I am proud to say 
that the Department of Justice has been a leader in enforcing the ADA’s protections.”). 
 38. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., Enforcement Activities, 
ADA.GOV: INFO. AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE ON THE AM. WITH DISABILITIES ACT, 
http://www.ada.gov/enforce_activities.htm [https://perma.cc/C6PF-9STL] (providing information 
about enforcement actions against Uber and Netflix, among others).  
 39. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101(b)(2)–(4) (2012) (“It is the purpose [of the ADA] . . . to provide 
clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards . . . to address the major areas of discrimination 
faced day-to-day by people with disabilities.”); see also Burgdorf, supra note 34, at 453 (“The 
Americans with Disabilities Act has the broadest scope of coverage of any single civil rights 
measure enacted to date.”). 
 40. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 3, at 50 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 
473 (“Separate-but-equal services do not accomplish this central goal and should be rejected.”); 
id. at 49–50 reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 472–73 (“The purpose of [T]itle II is to continue 
to break down barriers to the integrated participation of people with disabilities in all aspects of 
community life.”). 
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Other civil rights statutes narrowly define discrimination,41 but the 
ADA remains exceptionally broad, and intentionally so.42 Title II43 was 
designed to eliminate discrimination by public entities.44 Congress 
specified that Title II was enacted to extend the antidiscrimination 
mandate of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 “to all actions 
of state and local governments.”45 But the troubling reality of police 
encounters with the disability community undermines the ADA’s 
purpose.  
B.  Setting the Stage: Law Enforcement, the Disability Community, 
and the Title II Framework 
Safe arrests depend on effective communication between law 
enforcement and individuals suspected of wrongdoing.46 In fact, public 
entities, like city governments and local police departments, are 
already required to take steps to ensure effective communication with 
individuals with disabilities.47 But unfortunately, miscommunication is 
likely to occur,48 causing interactions to rapidly escalate and lead to 
 
 41. For an explanation of earlier civil rights statutes, see Burgdorf, supra note 34, at 426–29. 
 42. See 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(A) (subjecting “any State or local government” to Title II 
coverage).  
 43. Title I covers employment-related matters and Title III covers public accommodations 
and services operated by private entities. Id. § 12111; Id. § 12181. 
 44. The antidiscrimination provision of Title II reads: “Subject to the provisions of this 
subchapter, no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded 
from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public 
entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” Id. § 12132.  
 45. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 84 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 367. The 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 in many ways was the precursor to the ADA, but had a limited 
application to programs receiving federal funding. The ADA extended this by imposing an 
antidiscrimination mandate on all public entities, regardless of funding. See id. The House report 
notes:  
The first purpose [of the ADA] is to make applicable the prohibition against 
discrimination on the basis of disability, currently set out in regulations implementing 
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, to all programs, activities, and  
services . . . . Currently, [section 504] prohibits discrimination only by recipients of 
Federal financial assistance. 
Id.  
 46. See Ellen C. Wertlieb, Individuals with Disabilities in the Criminal Justice System, 18 
CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 332, 334 (1991) (“Discrediting a person’s statements may lead to an 
inappropriate arrest or the dismissal of a potentially dangerous situation.”). 
 47. 28 C.F.R. § 35.160(a)(1) (2016).  
 48. See ROBERT PERSKE, UNEQUAL JUSTICE? WHAT CAN HAPPEN WHEN PERSONS WITH 
RETARDATION OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES ENCOUNTER THE CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM 15–23 (1991) (listing common communication characteristics that can lead to 
misunderstanding).  
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injury, humiliation, or even death.49 Researchers have found that 
people with intellectual disabilities represent up to 10 percent of the 
prison population, despite accounting for only 2–3 percent of the 
general population.50 Furthermore, people with intellectual disabilities 
have the highest risk of violent victimization.51 Thus, given the 
frequency of interaction between law enforcement and individuals with 
disabilities, the risk of discrimination and its harmful effects becomes 
all the more real. Because “the officer . . . is the first point of contact 
for citizens with disabilities who are arrested,” it is particularly 
important to ensure police officers’ procedures are ADA compliant.52  
Title II of the ADA provides a source of liability when public 
entities and officials, such as police officers, engage in disability-based 
discrimination.53 In so doing, the law incents proper antidiscriminatory 
behavior in public arenas. Title II reads in part, “no qualified individual 
with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from 
participation in or be denied the benefits of services, programs, or 
activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any 
such entity.”54 A discrimination claim under Title II generally arises 
when an individual with a disability is (1) excluded from a public 
activity or (2) receives disparate benefits or treatment in the provision 
of that activity.55 Anchored by this statutory framework, courts 
addressing allegedly discriminatory arrests under Title II recognize two 
 
 49. See H. Richard Lamb, Linda E. Weinberger & Walter J. DeCuir, Jr., The Police and 
Mental Health, 53 AM. PSYCH. SERV. 1266, 1267, 1270 (2002) (noting that miscommunication is 
likely between individuals with disabilities and police officers and can lead to adverse results, such 
as death).  
 50. LEIGH ANN DAVIS, PEOPLE WITH INTELLECTUAL DISABILITIES IN THE CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM: VICTIMS & SUSPECTS 1 (2009), http://www.thearc.org/document.doc?id=3664 
[https://perma.cc/PA5D-MT3D]; see also id. at 2 (“[T]hese individuals are less likely to receive 
probation or parole and tend to serve longer sentences . . . .”). 
 51. Id.  
 52. James K. McAfee & Stephanie L. Musso, Training Police Officers About Persons with 
Disabilities: A 50-State Policy Analysis, 16 REMEDIAL & SPECIAL EDUC. 53, 53 (1995).  
 53. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2012).   
 54. Id.  
 55. See Gorman v. Bartch, 152 F.3d 907, 911 (8th Cir. 1998) (“[P]laintiff must demonstrate 
that: (1) he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) he was denied the benefits of a program 
or activity of a public entity which receives federal funds, and (3) he was discriminated against 
based on his disability.” (footnote omitted) (citing Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 504(a)(1), 29 
U.S.C. § 794(a)(1))). 
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categories: wrongful arrests and arrests that fail to provide a reasonable 
accommodation for the arrestee’s disability.56  
Wrongful arrests occur when an individual is arrested for 
noncriminal activity that is perceived as criminal because of innocuous 
disability-related behavior.57 When police officers approached Charles 
Lewis’s home to investigate a custody dispute, Lewis’s friends told the 
officers that Lewis was deaf.58 They asked that the officers 
communicate with Lewis through written questions.59 The officers, 
however, issued verbal commands to Lewis and “proceeded to kick and 
hit him” when he failed to respond.60 The officers were aware that 
Lewis would be unable to hear verbal commands, but nonetheless 
arrested him for criminal insubordination.61 Lacking the requisite 
criminal intent, Lewis should never have been arrested.62 The officers 
had reason to know Lewis would be unable to hear and comply with 
any verbal commands, not because he was criminally insubordinate, 
but because he was deaf.63  
The second category results from a failure to reasonably 
accommodate an individual’s disability, subjecting the individual to 
injury, humiliation, or indignity that someone without a disability 
would not face.64 A reasonable accommodation in the context of an 
arrest is the modification of police procedures to accommodate the 
individual’s disability.65 Jeffrey Gorman, a paraplegic, was kicked out 
 
 56. See, e.g., Gohier v. Enright, 186 F.3d 1216, 1220 (10th Cir. 1999) (recognizing the two 
different theories courts have used to analyze arrests under Title II as wrongful arrests and failure 
to provide a reasonable accommodation); Estate of Saylor v. Regal Cinemas, Inc., 54 F. Supp. 3d 
409, 425 (D. Md. 2014) (“Claims in the [arrest] context typically fall within two general 
categories.”). 
 57. See Gohier, 186 F.3d at 1220 (“[P]olice wrongly arrested someone with a disability 
because they misperceived the effects of that disability as criminal activity.”). 
 58. Lewis v. Truitt, 960 F. Supp. 175, 176 (S.D. Ind. 1997). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 176–77.  
 62. See id. at 179 (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss because “[d]efendants have cited 
to no evidence to contradict” the fact that they had no reason to arrest Lewis).  
 63. Id. at 176–77. 
 64. See Gohier v. Enright, 186 F.3d 1216, 1220–21 (“[W]hile police properly investigated and 
arrested a person with a disability for a crime unrelated to that disability, they failed to reasonably 
accommodate the person’s disability . . . causing the person to suffer greater injury or indignity in 
that process than other arrestees.”). 
 65. See id. at 1222 (discussing the theory that “Title II required [the city] to better train its 
police officers to recognize reported disturbances that are likely to involve persons with mental 
disabilities, and to investigate and arrest such persons in a manner reasonably accommodating 
their disability”).  
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of a bar in Kansas after the security guard banned his wheelchair from 
the dance floor.66 Once outside the bar, Gorman angrily recounted the 
story to nearby police officers, hoping they would help.67 The 
interaction quickly escalated and Gorman was arrested for 
trespassing.68 A van lacking proper wheelchair accommodations was 
sent to transport Gorman to the police station.69 Police officers lifted 
Gorman out of his wheelchair and fastened his torso to the seat of the 
van using a seatbelt and his own belt.70 Unable to independently remain 
upright when the makeshift safety measures came loose, Gorman fell 
to the floor of the van.71 The injuries he sustained required corrective 
surgery.72 In the course of the fall, Gorman’s urine bag was pierced, 
leaving him drenched in a puddle of his bodily waste for the remainder 
of the ride.73  
This case is distinguishable from Lewis’s case. Here, the police 
officers did have a legitimate reason to arrest Gorman. However, the 
provision of a van unequipped to accommodate Gorman’s wheelchair 
constituted the failure to reasonably accommodate him.74 As a result, 
Gorman suffered substantial physical injury and humiliation that an 
individual without a wheelchair would not have faced; therefore, the 
arrest proceeding was discriminatory.75  
These two examples illustrate the importance of ensuring ADA-
compliant arrests. Although Title II is generally accepted as the 
relevant statute,76 courts are split on whether to recognize 
discriminatory arrests under the ADA.77 Given the perilous nature of 
 
 66. Gorman v. Bartch, 152 F.3d 907, 909 (8th Cir. 1998). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id.  
 69. Id.  
 70. Id.   
 71. Id. at 910. 
 72. Id.  
 73. Id.  
 74. See id. at 913–14 (finding Gorman had a plausible ADA claim and remanding Gorman’s 
case for factual development).   
 75. I am primarily using this fact pattern as an illustrative example. The court here found 
that the discrimination claim was contingent upon additional facts. Id. at 916.  
 76. See Waller v. City of Danville, 515 F. Supp. 2d 659, 662–63 (W.D. Va. 2007) (recognizing 
the general acceptance that Title II applies to police officers and their activities).   
 77. See Gohier v. Enright, 186 F.3d 1216, 1221 (10th Cir. 1999) (“[A] broad rule categorically 
excluding arrests from the scope of Title II . . . is not the law.”); Gorman, 152 F.3d at 913 
(recognizing that a claim for discriminatory arrests can exist under Title II of the ADA based on 
legislative history, Supreme Court jurisprudence, and DOJ regulations). But see De Boise v. Taser 
Int’l., Inc., 760 F.3d 892, 899 (8th Cir. 2014) (expressing a willingness to recognize a discrimination 
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policing, the quick decisions required by police officers, and the duty 
to protect the community at large, some circuits afford officers an 
affirmative defense based on exigent circumstances, which limits the 
success of ADA claims.78 In 2014, the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari in a Ninth Circuit case, City of San Francisco v. Sheehan.79 
The central question posed was whether law enforcement should be 
required to reasonably accommodate an individual’s disability during 
an arrest that presented a potentially exigent circumstance.80 However, 
due to a “bait-and-switch”81 of arguments, the Court never issued an 
opinion on the matter. 
C.  The Supreme Court’s Missed Opportunity in Sheehan 
The Ninth Circuit ruled that Teresa Sheehan plausibly claimed the 
police officers violated the ADA when they made no modification to 
their procedures in light of Sheehan’s disability, but instead defaulted 
to deadly force.82 Although many courts are willing to accept that the 
ADA may apply to arrests, some have carved out a broad exception 
because “[t]he exigent circumstances presented by criminal activity 
and the already onerous tasks of police on the scene go more to the 
reasonableness of the requested ADA modification than whether the 
ADA applies in the first instance.”83 The Ninth Circuit acknowledged 
that Sheehan had a knife and was threatening to use it against the 
police officers who entered her room.84 However, given Sheehan’s 
qualifying disability, the court felt that the jury had sufficient 
information to decide whether Sheehan was denied her right to a 
reasonable accommodation under the ADA.85  
 
claim but not a willingness to second-guess police officer discretion in exigent circumstances); 
Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 801 (5th Cir. 2000) (“We simply hold that [discriminatory arrest] 
is not available under Title II under [exigent] circumstances . . . .”). 
 78. See Hainze, 207 F.3d at 801 (“[W]e hold that Title II does not apply to an officer’s on-
the-street responses to reported disturbances or other similar incidents, whether or not those calls 
involve subjects with . . . disabilities, prior to the officer’s securing the scene and ensuring that 
there is no threat to human life.”).   
 79. City of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765 (2015).  
 80. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, City of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765 
(2015) (No. 13-1412). 
 81. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. at 1779 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
 82. Sheehan v. City of San Francisco, 743 F.3d 1211, 1232–33 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d in part 
and cert. dismissed in part by 135 S. Ct. 1765 (2015). 
 83. Bircoll v. Miami-Dade Cty., 480 F.3d 1072, 1085 (11th Cir. 2007). 
 84. Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 1230. 
 85. The court found that the jury could decide the officers should have “wait[ed] for backup 
and . . . employ[ed] less confrontational tactics.” Id. at 1233. 
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The City of San Francisco appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing 
that the Ninth Circuit erred in holding that law enforcement officers 
must provide a reasonable accommodation to an individual with a 
disability brandishing a knife during an arrest.86 But in what Justice 
Scalia described as a “bait-and-switch,”87 the city accepted the premise 
of the very question it challenged in subsequent adversarial briefings 
and oral argument.88 The city acknowledged that law enforcement 
officers should be obliged to accommodate an individual’s disability in 
the course of an arrest, and argued instead that Sheehan was not 
qualified for ADA coverage, given the “direct threat” she posed.89  
Denied the opportunity to hear adversarial briefing, the Supreme 
Court dismissed the question as improvidently granted.90 However, the 
Court not only conveyed the importance of the issue but also 
delineated an analytic structure.91 Bearing in mind the basic Title II 
language introduced above,92 the Sheehan framework will seem 
familiar.93 According to the Supreme Court, arrests are subject to Title 
II if (1) “an arrest is an ‘activity’ in which the arrestee ‘participat[es]’ 
or from which the arrestee may ‘benefi[t]’”94 and (2) “the failure to 
arrest an individual with a . . . disability in a manner that reasonably 
accommodates that disability constitutes ‘discrimination.’”95 Although 
we are left to speculate how the Court might decide the question, the 
analysis must begin with statutory interpretation.  
 
 86. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 25, City of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765 
(2015) (No. 13-1412). The city also included an alternative argument alleging that, even if the 
officers were found to have denied Sheehan her right to reasonable accommodation, the officers 
should have been entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 28–29.  
 87. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. at 1779 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
 88. Id. at 1772 (majority opinion) (“Having persuaded us to grant certiorari, San Francisco 
chose to rely on a different argument than what it pressed below.”).   
 89. Id. at 1773. 
 90. Id. at 1774. 
 91. See id. at 1773 (discussing the analysis necessary to conclude that language in the ADA 
applies to arrests of qualified individuals with disabilities).   
 92. For further discussion, see infra Part II.B.  
 93. I am accepting, rather than challenging, the structure of the Sheehan framework because 
it mirrors all Title II analyses. 
 94. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. at 1773 (alterations in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2012)). 
 95. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12132). 
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II.  HOW THE ADA TREATS ARRESTS: AN EXERCISE IN STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION 
This Part conducts the analysis that the Supreme Court suggested 
in Sheehan by considering: (1) whether an arrest can be categorized as 
an activity96 in which the arrestee participates and benefits and (2) 
whether failing to reasonably accommodate an individual’s disability 
in the course of an arrest constitutes illegal discrimination under the 
ADA. Based on the ordinary meaning of “activity,” regulations 
interpreting Title II coverage, and other Supreme Court cases, an 
arrest qualifies as an activity, and the failure to reasonably 
accommodate an individual’s disability can result in illegal 
discrimination.  
A. Arrests as an “Activity” Under Title II 
As with all questions of statutory interpretation, analysis begins 
with the text of the statute.97 Title II states, in part, “[N]o qualified 
individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be 
excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of services, 
programs, or activities of a public entity . . . .”98 Although the law 
defines a public entity,99 it fails to define a public service, program, or 
activity. Sifting through these three possibilities, Justice Alito made a 
nonbinding yet helpful suggestion that arrests should be characterized 
as an “activity.”100  
 
 96. The word “activity” is used throughout this Note because that is how Justice Alito 
categorized arrests in Sheehan. Id. (“[Title II] would apply if an arrest is an ‘activity’ . . . .”). 
However, Title II would also cover arrests if arrests were categorized as a public service or 
program. For consistency, arrests are referred to as an activity.  
 97. E.g., Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 144–45 (1995). 
 98. 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Title II of the ADA defines a qualified individual as one who, “with 
or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of architectural, 
communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets 
the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs 
or activities provided by a public entity.” Id. § 12131(2). In other words, a person must, with or 
without a disability, be eligible to receive the benefits of the public program, service, or activity. 
 99. Public entities are defined, in part, as “any department, agency, special purpose district, 
or other instrumentality of a State or States or local government.” Id. § 12131(1)B). There is no 
disagreement that a police force is a public entity under the statute. See Waller v. City of Danville, 
515 F. Supp. 2d 659, 662–63 (W.D. Va. 2007) (“Courts have liberally interpreted [public  
entity] . . . to include . . . local police forces.”), aff’d, Waller ex rel. Estate of Hunt v. Danville, 556 
F.3d 171 (4th Cir. 2009).   
 100. See Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. at 1773. 
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According to a common canon of statutory interpretation, a word 
in a statute “must be given its ‘ordinary or natural meaning.’”101 The 
Oxford English Dictionary defines “activity” as “the quality or 
condition of being an agent or of performing an action or 
operation.”102Additionally, Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary defines 
activity as “an organizational unit or the function it performs.”103 Thus, 
while the definition of “activity” incorporates many endeavors, an 
arrest clearly fits within the ordinary dictionary meaning. Police 
officers are public agents and an arrest is an action taken by these 
agents to achieve the aim of public safety. Additionally, an arrest is a 
function performed by an organizational unit, the police department. 
To the extent that ambiguity remains as to the ordinary meaning of 
“activity,” interpretive regulations provide additional gap filling.104  
Congress granted explicit statutory authority to the DOJ to 
“promulgate regulations . . . that implement [Title II].”105 The 
regulations to Title II nearly mirror the statutory text106 and are granted 
substantial judicial deference.107 The regulatory language sweeps in 
everything a public entity does, regardless of whether the activity is 
funded with federal dollars.108 However, the regulatory language goes 
on to provide some necessary guidance by delineating two categories 
of activities subject to Title II:  
[T]hose involving general public contact as part of ongoing operations 
of the entity and those directly administered by the entities for 
program beneficiaries and participants. Activities in the first category 
include communication with the public (telephone contacts, office 
 
 101. Bailey, 516 U.S. at 145 (quoting Smith v. United States, 508 US. 223, 228 (1993)). 
 102. Activity, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, 2a (3d. ed. 2010), http://www.oed.com/
view/Entry/1958?redirectedFrom=activity#ied [https://perma.cc/5JFL-V9EZ]. 
 103. Activity, WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 20 (2d ed. 2001).  
 104. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984) (“If 
Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority 
to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation.”).  
 105. 42 U.S.C. § 12134(a) (2012). Furthermore, when Congress explicitly grants an agency 
interpretive authority, the agency’s regulations are granted deference unless they are found to be 
“arbitrary, capricious, or . . . contrary to the statute.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. 
 106. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.102(a) (2016) (“[T]his part applies to all services, programs, and 
activities provided or made available by public entities.”).  
 107. See, e.g., Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 331 (3d Cir. 1995) (“[R]egulations which the 
Department promulgated [under Title II] are entitled to substantial deference.”). 
 108. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.102(a) (“[Title II] applies to all . . . activities provided or made 
available by public entities.”); see also 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. B, § 35.102, at 677 (“Title II coverage, 
however, is not limited to ‘[e]xecutive’ agencies [as is the Rehabilitation Act], but includes 
activities of the legislative and judicial branches of State and local governments.”).  
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walk-ins, or interviews) and the public’s use of the entity’s facilities. 
Activities in the second category include programs that provide State 
or local government services or benefits.109 
An arrest likely qualifies under either of the categories. An arrest can 
be part of a public entity’s ongoing operations under the first category, 
or can be a program that provides “local government services”110 under 
the second category.  
It may seem unconventional to categorize arrests as an activity 
that benefits an individual. Generally we do not assume the individual 
arrested conceives of him- or herself as a beneficiary, nor do we assume 
the individual volunteered for the arrest. In fact, some courts have held 
arrests and law enforcement activity exempt from the ADA for this 
very reason, finding that an individual held against his or her will 
cannot be said to have participated in the activity voluntarily.111 The 
analysis of these courts, however, overlooks the fact that nothing in the 
language of the statute requires voluntariness. The Supreme Court 
explicitly recognized this principle in Pennsylvania Department of 
Corrections v. Yeskey.112  
An individual with a disability is qualified under Title II when he 
or she is eligible to participate in and benefit from a public activity, 
regardless of the impact of the disability.113 The statute, however, says 
nothing about the voluntariness of the individual’s participation. Based 
on the ordinary meaning of “eligibility” and “participation,” in Yeskey, 
the Supreme Court concluded that eligibility for Title II does not 
require an individual to participate voluntarily in “programs, services, 
and activities.”114 In Yeskey, an inmate in a state correctional facility, 
who met all the requirements to enroll in a diversion program for first-
time offenders, was denied participation in the program, and 
consequently its benefits, because of his disability.115 Justice Scalia 
noted that public entities offer many activities in which participation is 
 
 109. 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. B, § 35.102, at 677.  
 110. Id.  
 111. See Torcasio v. Murray, 57 F.3d 1340, 1347 (4th Cir. 1995) (“The terms ‘eligible’ and 
‘participate’ imply voluntariness on the part of an applicant who seeks a benefit from the state; 
they do not bring to mind [individuals] who are being held against their will.”).  
 112. Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 211 (1998).  
 113. See 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (2012) (“‘[Q]ualified individual with a disability’ means an 
individual with a disability who . . . meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of 
services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity.”).  
 114. Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 211. 
 115. Id. at 206.  
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mandatory, refuting the claim that one must submit voluntarily to a 
program.116 Reading in a voluntary participation requirement for 
arrests would be contrary to the statute’s language.  
Nor can it be said that an arrested individual receives no benefit 
from the arrest. Sheehan itself illustrates this point. Home workers 
called the police out of concern that Sheehan might hurt herself. The 
police officers were called to protect Sheehan and help ensure her 
safety, a benefit that she could have received had the arrest been ADA 
compliant.117 But because the officers failed to modify their tactics in 
light of her disability, she suffered substantial injury.118 Thus, arrest 
proceedings do provide a benefit when they are conducted 
appropriately. An arrest proceeding that results in an unequal benefit 
because of one’s disability constitutes discrimination under the ADA, 
as analyzed in the next Section.  
B.  Discriminatory Arrests Under Title II 
Title II not only addresses the scope of the ADA’s application to 
public entities, but also mandates that public entities provide benefits 
and conduct activities in a nondiscriminatory manner. Title II states, 
“[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall . . . be subjected to 
discrimination by [public] entit[ies].”119 Although the statutory text 
does not define discrimination, the ADA’s other provisions, statutory 
purpose, interpretive regulations, and legislative history provide 
instructive insight into the meaning of discrimination under Title II. 
Taken together, discrimination under Title II occurs when an 
individual with disabilities receives an unequal benefit from an activity 
because of his or her disability.120 Discrimination often results when 
public entities fail to modify policies and procedures in a manner that 
would reasonably accommodate the individual’s disability, leading to a 
distinct injury.121 
 
 116. Id. at 211 (“A drug addict convicted of drug possession, for example, might, as part of his 
sentence, be required to participate in a drug treatment program for which only addicts are 
‘eligible.’”).  
 117. City of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1768 (2015).  
 118. See id. at 1767 (“[T]he officers shot Sheehan multiple times.”). 
 119. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2012).  
 120. See, e.g., Gohier v. Enright, 186 F.3d 1216, 1219 (10th Cir. 1999) (applying the standard).  
 121. See, e.g., Schorr v. Borough of Lemoyne, 243 F. Supp. 2d 232, 236 (M.D. Pa. 2003) 
(recognizing that modification of policies and procedures can effectuate the ADA’s 
antidiscrimination mandate).  
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Although Title II does not define discrimination, Titles I and III 
make clear that discrimination constitutes the receipt of different 
benefits because of a disability.122 Title I prohibits employment-based 
disability discrimination.123 The antidiscrimination mandate in Title I 
includes “denying equal . . . benefits to a qualified individual because 
of the known disability.”124 Title III prohibits discrimination in public 
accommodations.125 Like Title I, Title III’s antidiscrimination mandate 
focuses on unequal benefits or opportunities, reading in part, “[I]t shall 
be discriminatory to afford an individual . . . the opportunity to 
participate in or benefit from a [program] that is not equal to that 
afforded to other individuals.”126 Thus, under both Titles I and III, 
disparate treatment through the provision of unequal benefits because 
of one’s disability constitutes illegal discrimination; and so it does 
under Title II.127 
If discrimination is the injury, a reasonable accommodation is the 
envisioned prevention mechanism. Notwithstanding the absence of 
similar language in Title II, Titles I and III provide for reasonable 
accommodation as the primary mechanism to avoid discrimination. 
Under Title I, discrimination results when a group fails to “mak[e] 
reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental 
limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability.”128 
Like Title I, Title III uses “reasonable modifications” as a tool to avoid 
discrimination.129 Under Title III, discrimination results from a “failure 
to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, 
when such modifications are necessary to . . . accommodate[] 
 
 122. When the same word is used in different parts of a statute, we can infer that the word 
carries a similar meaning throughout the statute. See Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 143 
(1994) (“A term appearing in several places in a statutory text is generally read the same way 
each time it appears.”).  
 123. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). 
 124. Id. § 12112(b)(4).   
 125. Id. § 12182. 
 126. Id. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 
 127. In fact, courts have found the provision of unequal benefits to constitute a violation of 
Title II. See, e.g., Frame v. City of Arlington, 657 F.3d 215, 231 (5th Cir. 2011) (finding petitioners 
had a valid claim under the antidiscrimination clause of Title II of the ADA as they were denied 
the benefits of the city’s sidewalks).   
 128. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).  
 129. Although Title I uses the phrase “reasonable accommodation” and Title III uses 
“reasonable modification,” many courts use these words and standards interchangeably. See 
Johnson v. Spoetzl Brewery, 116 F.3d 1052, 1059 (5th Cir. 1997) (noting that the parallel language 
in Titles I and III lends itself to using the two interchangeably for analysis purposes).  
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individuals with disabilities.”130 Therefore, in both titles, the provision 
of reasonable accommodations is necessary to ensure equal benefits, 
thus avoiding illegal discrimination. Courts have also required 
reasonable accommodations under Title II to prevent discrimination.131 
It may seem peculiar that Titles I and III set out the law more 
precisely than Title II. But Titles I and III were entirely new provisions 
under the ADA, while Title II extended an already-existing law.132 
Because of this, Congress did not draft similar language for Title II. 
Congress intended Title II to be interpreted in accordance with Titles 
I and III and remain equally broad. Legislative history supports133 this 
assertion: “Title II should be read to incorporate provisions of Titles I 
and III” that are otherwise consistent with Title II.134 As one 
congressional report notes, “[T]he committee has chosen not to list all 
types of actions that would constitute discrimination because [T]itle II 
extends the anti-discrimination prohibition of Section 504 [of the 
Rehabilitation Act] to all actions of state and local government.”135  
In addition, the overall statutory purpose of the ADA supports a 
clear and comprehensive antidiscrimination mandate that can be easily 
implemented: 
It is the purpose of [the ADA] (1) to provide a clear and 
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of 
discrimination against individuals with disabilities; (2) to provide 
clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing 
discrimination . . . (3) to ensure that the Federal Government plays a 
central role in enforce[ment] . . . and (4) to invoke the sweep of 
congressional authority . . . to address the major areas of 
discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities.136  
To carry out this general purpose of eliminating discrimination through 
effective enforcement, Congress enacted Title II to eliminate 
disability-based discrimination in all aspects of public community 
 
 130. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii).  
 131. See, e.g., Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261, 276 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding that, under 
Title II, “the demonstration that a disability makes it difficult for a plaintiff to access benefits that 
are available to both those with and without disabilities is sufficient to sustain a claim for a 
reasonable accommodation”). 
 132. See Schorr v. Borough of Lemoyne, 243 F. Supp. 2d 232, 236 (M.D. Pa. 2003) (explaining 
that Title II expands the Rehabilitation Act’s antidiscrimination provision found in Section 504).  
 133. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 3, at 51 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 474.  
 134. Id., reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 475. 
 135. Id., pt. 2, at 84, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 367.  
 136. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101(b)(1)–(4). 
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life.137 Congress recognized the plethora of settings in which 
discrimination may arise and was aware that eliminating discrimination 
would be burdensome but necessary.138 Ensuring the receipt of equal 
benefits in all public activities, including arrests, fits squarely within the 
larger statutory scheme. In fact, Congress intended that reasonable 
accommodations be used to avoid discrimination in Title II.139  
The ADA regulations provide an additional source of support.140 
A public entity is prohibited from “provid[ing an activity] that is not as 
effective in affording equal opportunity to obtain the same result [or] 
to gain the same benefit . . . as that provided to others. . . .”141 
Additionally, “[a] public entity shall make reasonable modifications in 
policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary 
to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability.”142 This language 
aligns Title II with Titles I and III. First, the regulatory definition of 
discrimination nearly mirrors the statutory definitions articulated in 
Titles I and III. Second, similarly to Titles I and III, the regulatory 
language incorporates reasonable accommodation as a tool to help 
avoid discrimination.  
A discriminatory arrest occurs when an individual with a disability 
receives a different benefit from an arrest than one without a disability 
would receive.143 In an arrest proceeding, the benefit sought is a safe 
and appropriate arrest.144 Thus, to avoid discrimination, law 
enforcement officers are required to modify their customary arrest 
proceedings in a manner that reasonably accommodates the 
individual’s disability. When an individual’s disability is not considered 
 
 137. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 3, at 49–50 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 
472–73 (“The purpose of [T]itle II is to continue to break down barriers to the integrated 
participation of people with disabilities in all aspects of community life.”).  
 138. Id. at 50, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 473 (“While the integration of people with 
disabilities will sometimes involve substantial short-term burdens . . . the long-range effects of 
integration will benefit society as a whole.”). 
 139. Id. (“The provision of reasonable accommodation is central to [Title II’s] 
nondiscrimination mandate.”). 
 140. For a Chevron analysis of Title II’s enforcement and interpretive regulations, see supra 
notes 97–110 and accompanying text. 
 141. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1)(iii) (2016). 
 142. Id. § 35.130(b)(7). 
 143. To clarify, during an arrest, individuals with disabilities should, when necessary, receive 
different treatment than individuals without disabilities. Police officers should modify standard 
policies to accommodate the individual’s disability. In so doing, the individual will receive the 
same benefit as someone without a disability: a safe and appropriate arrest.   
 144. For illustrative examples of the different treatment individuals with disabilities are 
subject to, see supra Part I.B.  
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and accommodated, that individual is likely to receive a benefit that 
differs greatly from someone without a disability, thus constituting 
discrimination. Other provisions of the ADA, the overall statutory 
purpose, interpretive regulations, and legislative history all support 
such an interpretation.  
Some courts arrive at a similar conclusion.145 Others, however, 
reject the application of Title II to arrests because of the potential risk 
to public safety should officers be required to pause and consider a 
disability.146 Although public safety is rightly a chief concern, the next 
Part will explain why these courts have mistakenly emphasized this and 
consequently misconstrued the ADA’s mandate.  
III.  ACCOMPLISHING THE ADA’S GOALS WITHOUT RISKING 
PUBLIC SAFETY 
In reviewing arrests gone wrong and subsequent ADA-violation 
claims, some courts have expressed concern that requiring a police 
officer to pause and reasonably accommodate a disability will threaten 
public safety.147 Consider the facts in Sheehan.148 Police officers were 
called to intervene when Sheehan, who has schizophrenia and was off 
her medication, had a knife and was threatening to use it. The police 
officers had to make a quick decision about how to most effectively 
protect everyone involved. According to some circuits, obliging 
officers to pause and contemplate a reasonable accommodation could 
risk public safety, and is therefore not required.149 But what these 
courts fail to recognize is that the ADA still applies regardless of an 
exigency. Rather than strip injured parties of their rights under the 
ADA, courts should analyze exigent circumstances as a direct-threat 
affirmative defense to an ADA violation. In fact, the petitioners in 
Sheehan amended their argument in this precise fashion.  
 
 145. See, e.g., Schorr v. Borough of Lemoyne, 243 F. Supp. 2d 232, 236 (M.D. Pa. 2003) (“The 
legislative history of the ADA provides additional support for a broad interpretation 
encompassing [arrests under the ADA].”).   
 146. See Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 801 (5th Cir. 2000) (“Title II does not apply to an 
officer’s on-the-street responses to reported disturbances . . . .”)  
 147. See id. (“To require the officers to factor in whether their actions are going to comply 
with the ADA, in the presence of exigent circumstances and prior to securing the safety of 
themselves, other officers, and any nearby civilians, would pose an unnecessary risk to 
innocents.”). 
 148. For a review of the facts in Sheehan, see supra Part I.C.  
 149. For examples, see supra note 15. 
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Title I and Title III of the ADA stipulate that an otherwise 
qualified individual will be exempt from ADA coverage when the 
individual poses a “direct threat to the health or safety of others.”150 
Title II does not include this exemption in the text of the law.151 
However, the DOJ’s interpretive regulations once again align Title II 
with Titles I and III.152 “This part does not require a public entity to 
permit an individual to participate in or benefit from the services, 
programs, or activities of that public entity when that individual poses 
a direct threat to the health or safety of others.”153 The regulation 
thereafter guides courts and public entities by clarifying that a direct-
threat affirmative defense claim under Title II requires an 
individualized assessment:  
[A] public entity must make an individualized assessment . . . that 
relies on current medical knowledge or on the best available objective 
evidence, to ascertain: the nature, duration, and severity of the risk; 
the probability that the potential injury will actually occur; and 
whether reasonable modifications . . . will mitigate the risk.154  
Taken together, these regulations address the concern of reluctant 
courts. When an individual truly poses a direct threat to others, police 
officers are relieved from their duty to comply with the ADA because 
the individual is no longer qualified under the ADA. But the 
regulation’s main contribution is in recognizing that an accurate direct-
threat analysis is contingent on an individualized assessment.155 
Enabling police officers to make such assessments necessitates 
comprehensive disability training.156 Sheehan’s story illustrates the 
importance of training in making an individualized direct-threat 
assessment. 
 
 150. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3) (2012); see also id. § 12113(b) (“The term ‘qualification 
standards’ may include a requirement that an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health 
or safety of other individuals in the workplace.”). 
 151. For a discussion of why Title II often lacks the detail of Titles I and III, see supra notes 
129–35 and accompanying text. 
 152. For a Chevron analysis of Title II’s interpretive and enforcement regulations, see supra 
notes 97–110 and accompanying text. 
 153. 28 C.F.R. § 35.139(a) (2016) (emphasis added). 
 154. Id. (emphasis added). 
 155. See id. (“In determining whether an individual poses a direct threat to the health or safety 
of others, a public entity must make an individualized assessment.”). 
 156. This notion is supported by regulatory guidance and legislative history, discussed infra 
Part IV. 
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When the City of San Francisco amended its brief in Sheehan, its 
argument shifted away from arrests under the ADA generally to 
Sheehan herself, arguing that she posed a direct threat.157 Rather than 
argue that the ADA did not apply because of the exigency, the city 
claimed an affirmative defense that there was no duty to reasonably 
accommodate Sheehan because she was a direct threat to the officers 
and her community.158 While claiming the individual presented a direct 
threat is a valid affirmative defense, the city’s application was flawed. 
The San Francisco police officers failed to assess the true risk Sheehan 
posed and thus did not consider whether she could be reasonably 
accommodated by a change in procedure, as required by law.  
The officers were uniquely situated to make a thoughtful 
individual assessment of Sheehan’s needs. They were in a group home 
with staff who knew about Sheehan’s disability.159 Thus, the officers 
had resources readily available to assess the level of risk Sheehan posed 
and to determine whether a modification could be made that would 
accommodate her disability.160 An expert in Sheehan’s case suggested 
a few appropriate accommodations: respecting her comfort zone, using 
calm and concise communication, and allowing the passage of time to 
diminish the risk.161 Nothing, however, indicates that the officers 
conducted an individualized assessment as required by law.162 The 
officers had an opportunity to modify their procedures in a way that 
would have ensured Sheehan’s safety. Doing so would have not only 
prevented Sheehan’s injuries, but also protected the officers from legal 
recourse.  
Courts that focus on exigencies as a barrier to ADA compliance 
also overlook the timing of events. Police officers receive training far 
before an exigency presents itself.163 In Ethan Saylor’s case, the failure 
 
 157. See City of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1772–73 (2015) (noting that 
petitioners shifted to analyze whether Sheehan was herself a qualified individual given the 
potential exigency).  
 158. Id. at 1773. 
 159. Id. at 1767.  
 160. See Brief for Respondent, at 40–42, City of San Francisco, 135 S. Ct. 1765 (2015) (No. 13-
1412). 
 161. Id. at 37. 
 162. Id. at 40; see Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. at 1768 (stating the officers did not consider “if they 
could accommodate [Sheehan’s] disability”). 
 163. See Schorr v. Borough of Lemoyne, 243 F. Supp. 2d 232, 238 (M.D. Pa. 2003) (“The 
alleged non-compliance with the training requirements of the ADA did not occur the day that the 
officers shot Ryan Schorr; it occurred well before that day . . . .”). 
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to train occurred well before the officers encountered him.164 At the 
time of the encounter, however, the officers’ behavior evidenced an 
absence of disability training. Had the officers received comprehensive 
disability training, they may have implemented a different course of 
action; perhaps they never would have approached Saylor to begin 
with, heeding his aide’s advice.  
Training is a necessary mechanism to effectuate the purpose of the 
ADA. Comprehensive disability training helps protect police officers, 
the community, and individuals with disabilities by ensuring police 
officers will be less likely to conflate exigent circumstances with 
ordinary symptoms of a disability. Officers can thereafter modify their 
policies and procedures in a manner that best accommodates the 
individual’s particular needs.165  
IV.  POLICE OFFICER TRAINING AS AN ADA-COMPLIANCE 
MECHANISM 
In my experience, officers who can recognize and delineate disabilities 
become ambassadors. Once their awareness is raised, they are 
amazingly helpful in avoiding inappropriate arrests.166 
When off-duty deputies charged into the theater where Saylor was 
watching a movie, they had reason to know of his disability. Not only 
is Down syndrome facially recognizable, but his aide verbally informed 
them of his disability. Despite knowledge of the disability, the deputies’ 
actions evidenced a lack of awareness of how to interact with an 
individual with Down syndrome. Had they been trained to understand 
the complexities of Down syndrome, Saylor might still be alive today. 
This Part analyzes the statutory and legal support for requiring 
comprehensive disability training, thereafter discussing the prevalence 
and substance of existing training programs. This Part concludes by 
introducing a model for disability training enacted by the Maryland 
legislature in honor of Ethan Saylor. 
 
 164. See Estate of Saylor v. Regal Cinemas, Inc., 54 F. Supp. 3d 409, 426 (D. Md. 2014) 
(discussing plaintiffs’ Title II argument that the failure to train was based on a right to have law 
enforcement equipped to interact with members of the disabled community).   
 165. See supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
 166. Dolores Norley, Defendants with Retardation: Quintessential Cast-offs, Keynote 
Address at Developmentally Disabled Offender Program (June 4, 1986), in PERSKE, supra note 
48, at 25.  
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A.  Statutory and Legal Support for Comprehensive Disability 
Training   
Courts, Congress, and the DOJ have recognized that disability 
training is necessary to defend the ADA’s antidiscrimination mandate. 
Courts recognize the logic in police officer training as an ADA-
compliance mechanism.167 Ryan Schorr was hospitalized when his 
bipolar disorder spiraled out of control.168 But Schorr escaped from the 
facility.169 Schorr’s parents enlisted local police officers to help their son 
and asked that they bring him back to the hospital.170 However, a 
violent confrontation transpired at Schorr’s apartment in which he was 
shot and killed.171 Schorr’s parents thereafter brought a claim against 
the police commission alleging that the absence of disability training 
proximately caused their son’s death.172 The court agreed: “[The police 
commission] failed to institute policies to accommodate disabled 
individuals . . . by giving the officers the tools and resources to handle 
the situation peacefully.”173 The Tenth Circuit also recognized the logic 
inherent in such a claim: “[Plaintiff] might have argued that Title II 
required Colorado Springs to better train its police officers to 
recognize reported disturbances that are likely to involve persons with 
mental disabilities, and to investigate and arrest such persons in a 
manner reasonably accommodating their disability.”174 
That a training manual on disabilities exists, however, is 
insufficient for ADA compliance. The court in Saylor acknowledged 
that effective ADA training must actually aid the officers’ interaction 
 
 167. See, e.g., Schorr v. Borough of Lemoyne, 243 F. Supp. 2d 232, 235 (M.D. Pa. 2003) 
(concluding that Congress’s broad policy mandate to eliminate discrimination must necessarily 
include training of police officers). But see Waller v. City of Danville, 515 F. Supp. 2d 659, 665 
(W.D. Va. 2007) (“The act or omission involved in failing to train police officers to deal with 
mentally ill individuals may have a disparate impact on such individuals as a class, but can never 
by itself equate to a specific act of intentional discrimination against a particular plaintiff.”), aff’d, 
Waller ex rel. Estate of Hunt v. City of Danville, 556 F.3d 171, 177 (4th Cir. 2009). The decision 
in Waller v. City of Danville was appealed to the Fourth Circuit, but the Fourth Circuit punted on 
the question of training. Waller, 556 F.3d at 177. The court’s analysis in Waller, however, was 
flawed as it applied standards for a failure-to-train claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1983 rather than failure 
to train under the ADA. See id. at 177 n.3 (using a Supreme Court case on § 1983 liability to find 
no grounds for a failure-to-train claim under the ADA).  
 168. Schorr, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 233. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 234. 
 173. Id. at 238. 
 174. Gohier v. Enright, 186 F.3d 1216, 1222 (10th Cir. 1999). 
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with the person.175 In Saylor, the defendants attempted to introduce the 
sheriff’s department’s general order regarding the “Investigation of 
Persons with Mental Illness”176 as factual evidence of disability-related 
training material.177 But the court suggested that it would take more 
than a paper document to satisfy the ADA’s training requirement.178 
To suffice, training must actually enable officers to modify their 
procedures to best accommodate the individual’s disability.179    
Legislative history also supports police officer training as an 
ADA-compliance mechanism. Recognizing Title II’s broad obligation 
to eliminate disability discrimination in public arenas, the House 
Judiciary Committee noted: 
In order to comply with the non-discrimination mandate, it is often 
necessary to provide training to public employees about disability. 
For example, persons who have . . . a variety of other disabilities, are 
frequently inappropriately arrested . . . because police officers have 
not received proper training . . . . Such discriminatory treatment based 
on disability can be avoided by proper training.180 
The regulations provide additional support. In redrafting Title II 
regulations, commentators requested that mandatory police officer 
training be included.181 The DOJ did not adopt this recommendation, 
however, because the regulatory scheme already “requires law 
enforcement to make changes in policies that result in discriminatory 
arrests or abuse of individuals with disabilities.”182 The regulation also 
provides that “law enforcement personnel [are] required to make 
 
 175. See Estate of Saylor v. Regal Cinemas, Inc., 54 F. Supp. 3d 409, 428 (D. Md. 2014) 
(refusing to accept the state’s argument that consideration in a training manual should be 
dispositive). 
 176. While the court did not take issue with the title of the order, the title itself self-evidences 
an absence of disability awareness. Saylor had Down syndrome, a developmental disability. 
Developmental disabilities are categorically distinct from mental illness.  
 177. Saylor, 54 F. Supp. 3d at 427 n.10.  
 178. Id. at 427–28 (addressing the evidence presented and then noting that the language itself 
does not per se “absolve[] its responsibility to develop a policy relating to those with 
developmental disabilities”).  
 179. Id. at 427 (addressing the General Order presented and then noting, “[I]t would not 
appear that the Deputies were trained to make any modification at all in their treatment of 
individuals with developmental disabilities” and “[t]hey did not appear to have made any 
adjustment in their response to Mr. Saylor”). 
 180. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 3, at 50 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 473 
(emphasis added). 
 181. 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. B, § 35.130, at 686 (2016).  
 182. Id.  
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appropriate efforts to determine whether perceived strange or 
disruptive behavior or unconsciousness is the result of a disability.”183 
Thus, the DOJ already interprets Title II and its regulations to include 
police officer training. Like Congress, the DOJ acknowledged that full 
compliance with the ADA requires effective police officer training. In 
fact, the DOJ acted on this in a settlement agreement when it sought 
police officer training that “ensure[s] that staff understand the legal 
obligation . . . necessary to ensure effective communication with 
qualified individuals with disabilities.”184 Therefore, insistence on 
adequate disability training should be neither novel nor contentious. 
B.  The Prevalence and Substance of Disability Training Programs 
The DOJ recognized the need for police training but also assumed 
its ubiquity.185 However, comprehensive police officer training is far 
from ubiquitous. Dating back to 1991, a presidential task force report 
noted the “urgent need to greatly upgrade the training” of police on 
how to interact with people with intellectual and developmental 
disabilities.186 A few years later, one study asked all fifty states whether 
the “state require[s] officers to complete training about individuals 
with disabilities.”187 Researchers found that twelve states either had no 
such training or had ambiguous training descriptions.188 Of the 
remaining thirty-six states in the study,189 only four had a specific ADA 
training program.190 Additionally, a mere four states included training 
on intellectual disabilities, and only two had training on developmental 
disabilities.191 As of 2010, only seven states had adopted the Uniform 
 
 183. Id.  
 184. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA AND THE WALLINGFORD POLICE DEPARTMENT (Aug. 18, 2015), http://www.ada.gov/
wallingford_sa.html [https://perma.cc/WLL3-P3HU]. 
 185. 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. B, § 35.130, at 686 (“The general regulatory obligation to modify 
policies, practices, or procedures [already] requires law enforcement to make changes in 
policies . . . .”). 
 186. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CITIZENS WITH MENTAL RETARDATION 
AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 32 (1991).   
 187. See McAfee & Musso, supra note 52, at 57 (observing the prevalence, or lack thereof, of 
police training programs that relate to individuals with disabilities across the United States).  
 188. Id. The study’s applicability may be limited given that it was conducted only five years 
after the ADA’s enactment.  
 189. Two states did not participate in the study. 
 190. McAfee & Musso, supra note 187, at 60 tbl.3. 
 191. Id. 
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Duties to Disabled Persons Act, a law requiring police officers to 
determine whether someone is disabled prior to an arrest.192  
Even the states with some disability training for police officers are 
missing the mark. Sheehan and Saylor illustrate this point. The police 
officers in both cases underwent basic disability training, but were still 
unequipped to make on-the-scene modifications of arrest procedures 
to avoid discrimination and death.193 That the officers received training 
but still behaved as they did evidences the programs’ ineffectiveness.  
Disabilities can be difficult to recognize, particularly if one’s 
exposure is limited to a paper manual. Thus, comprehensive disability 
training that requires interaction with, or videos depicting, individuals 
with disabilities should be the preferred method. The DOJ does 
provide training videos for police departments,194 but legislative action 
would be best. An exemplary model comes from the state of Maryland 
in honor of Ethan Saylor.  
C.  A Model for Disability Training: The Ethan Saylor Bill 
In May 2015, Maryland passed the Ethan Saylor Bill.195 This law 
takes an innovative approach to disability training for public 
employees.196 Self-advocates, people with disabilities who volunteer to 
educate others, are an integral component of Maryland’s new training 
requirement.197 To date, Maryland is the only state to enact a law 
mandating the incorporation of self-advocates in police officer 
training.198 Affording law enforcement the opportunity to engage with 
individuals with disabilities in a controlled and safe setting will help 
foster effective communication before the presence of any potential 
 
 192. See DUKE CHEN, OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH, CONN. GEN. ASSEMBLY, 
POLICE PROCEDURE FOR DEALING WITH THE MENTALLY AND PHYSICALLY DISABLED  
IN OTHER STATES (2010), https://www.cga.ct.gov/2010/rpt/2010-R-0324.htm [https://perma.cc/
EB8P-LWR5]. 
 193. See supra notes 157−62, 175−77 and accompanying text; see also Brief for Respondent at 
6–7, City of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1775 (2015) (No. 13-1412) (noting that the 
officers’ behavior was contradictory to the relevant police policy received in training). 
 194. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., Police Response to People with Disabilities, 
ADA.GOV: INFO. AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE ON THE AMS. WITH DISABILITIES ACT, 
http://www.ada.gov/policevideo/policebroadbandgallery.htm#Anchor-Part-48213 [https://perma.
cc/X2P6-8VPF] (last updated May 1, 2006). 
 195. Ethan Saylor Alliance for Self-Advocates as Educators, ch. 388, 2015 Md. Laws.  
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Debra Alfarone, Ethan Saylor Bill Signed in Maryland, WUSA 9 LOCAL  
(May 13, 2015), http://www.wusa9.com/story/news/local/maryland/2015/05/12/ethan-saylor-bill-
md/27198967 [https://perma.cc/LG2N-JPXS].  
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exigencies. When law enforcement officers are called to a scene 
involving an individual with a disability, they will have tangible 
experience to draw on rather than static advice from a training manual.  
In May 2016, the Montgomery County police department held a 
training event to bridge the communication gap and foster 
understanding between the police and people with autism.199 As part of 
this event, people with autism and their families were invited to tour 
the police station, meet the police dogs, and see the vehicles and 
equipment used by officers. In turn, police officers were encouraged to 
learn and interact with the attendees. One participant, Gordy 
Baylinson, a teenager with nonspeaking autism, was so moved by the 
event that he wrote a letter to the police.200 He had heard “too many 
tragic stories of [police] mistreatment and mishandling of autistics due 
to lack of knowledge.”201 And so, Baylinson wrote, “[T]his letter  
is . . . a cry for attention. With your attention, I can help you recognize 
the signs of nonspeaking autism. If you can recognize the signs, then 
you will be able to recognize our differences which then leads to 
understanding . . . .”202 
Training, like the event in Montgomery County, that includes 
people with disabilities benefits not only the disability community but 
the law enforcement community as well. “[Police] don’t enjoy having 
to be . . . fearful or hostile in their approach. They see themselves [] as 
the guardians of safety and harmony. They are appalled when faced 
with the possibility of an inappropriate arrest caused by their having 
too little understanding of a new situation.”203 Had the police officers 
in Saylor and Sheehan been armed with adequate training and effective 
communication skills, both cases may have ended peacefully rather 
than tragically. 
 
 199. Jennifer Davis, Md. Teen Writes Letter to Police Providing Insight on Being Non-
Speaking with Autism, FOX 5 LOCAL NEWS (May 20, 2016), http://www.fox5dc.com/news/local-
news/143596753-story [https://perma.cc/J8P6-Y7W9]. 
 200. Id.  
 201. Colby Itkowitz, This Nonspeaking Teenager Wrote an Incredibly Profound Letter 
Explaining Autism, WASH. POST (May 19, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/inspired-
life/wp/2016/05/19/this-non-speaking-teen-wrote-an-incredibly-profound-letter-to-police-about-
autism [https://perma.cc/5YF7-SJVX]. 
 202. Id.  
 203. Norley, supra note 48, at 25. 
RIFKIN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/21/2016  11:18 AM 
2017]   SUBJECTING ARRESTS TO ADA COVERAGE 941 
CONCLUSION 
The ADA was enacted to eradicate disability discrimination. 
Knowing that miscommunication between law enforcement and 
individuals with disabilities could lead to discrimination, Congress 
intended that police officer activity be subject to ADA coverage, just 
like all other public activities. Thus, law enforcement officers should 
be required to comply with the ADA during arrests by reasonably 
accommodating an individual’s disability, so long as that person is not 
a direct threat to others. Comprehensive police officer training that 
humanizes people with disabilities can enable officers to make accurate 
individualized assessments about the level of threat posed and to 
appropriately modify police procedures to best accommodate the 
individual. Although society has come a long way in guaranteeing 
equal opportunity for individuals with disabilities, the stories of Saylor 
and Sheehan reflect a dangerous vulnerability in the ADA’s promise 
of protection.  
 
